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From UOC mothers to ATO brothers: how Ukrainians become Russian agents and what they gain from betrayal.

From UOC mothers to ATO brothers: how Ukrainians become Russian agents and what they gain from betrayal.

Even in the third year of full-scale war, alongside the obvious external enemy, there remains a certain number of Ukrainian citizens who assist them. This is evidenced by the statistics of arrests of individuals who leak coordinates of both civilian and military targets, as well as the locations and movement routes of our soldiers.

"Telegraph" inquired about the stories behind the spotters and fire adjusters, and what types of punishment are provided by law for the enemy's accomplices.

Spotters and fire adjusters can operate anywhere

The exposure and arrest of Ukrainians who help the enemy strike civilian or military targets have been occurring regularly since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. They operate both individually and in groups, near the front line and deep in the rear. For instance, in July of this year, the Security Service of Ukraine tracked down a 49-year-old resident of Donbas, who was "leaking" the positions of our artillery units holding off enemy assaults. He also attempted to obtain the coordinates of air defense units in the Konstantinovka area.

In Odessa, a trio of young men was detained two months apart for adjusting missile strikes not only on the resort city, particularly the strike carried out by "Iskander" missiles on March 15, but they also "operated" in the capital as well as in the Poltava and Zhytomyr regions.

In the early days of November, the SBU counterintelligence "caught in the act" a 23-year-old resident of Sumy, who was carrying out yet another task from his Russian handler. It was based on his guidance that residential buildings in the regional center were attacked on October 22. At that time, kamikaze drones killed a mother and her 14-year-old daughter, as well as their relative.

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The enemy's intelligence agency recruits Ukrainians through various means, often via pro-Russian Telegram channels or social networks. However, there are exceptions. For example, a 23-year-old man from Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region was hanging out on a dating site and met a girl who turned out to be an employee of Russian special services. After exchanging pleasantries, she began asking him to carry out specific tasks, and the young man agreed: his duties involved monitoring the work of Ukrainian air defense. For this purpose, he even moved to Sumy, rented an apartment there, and set up an observation post from which he conducted online broadcasts of the city's shelling.

Some get involved in helping the Russians through acquaintances. For instance, a kindergarten guard from Zaporizhzhia was pushed onto this path by a choir member from a local church that was subordinated to the UOC ("Moscow Patriarchate"). The woman relocated to the occupied part of the region and sought helpers to gather information from the territory controlled by Ukraine. One such report from the Zaporizhzhia resident led to a strike on Stepnohorsk right before the start of 2024, resulting in one death and the destruction of residential buildings.

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- Crimes related to adjusting enemy fire are exposed by the SBU in almost all regions, with particular attention paid to frontline areas, – stated the response to a request from "Telegraph" by the Department of Interaction with Mass Media and Public Relations of the SBU. – In the process of documenting these crimes, SBU investigators identify several typical motives for which citizens assist the enemy. These include ideological beliefs, promises of monetary rewards, blackmail, or threats of physical violence (for example, if the person’s relatives live in temporarily occupied territories).

- Conscientious individuals who are subjected to such blackmail report to law enforcement authorities, — noted the head of the Department of Oversight of Law Compliance by Security Agencies of the Office of the Prosecutor General, Ivan Kisilevich, in response to a similar question. – We dealt with a military personnel’s report, who was threatened regarding his parents in occupied Crimea by FSB agents demanding certain information. Our special services, within the framework of criminal proceedings, ensured the provision of false information, identified enemy representatives, and mitigated risks of influence on the military's relatives – evacuating them from the occupation.

We also examined the motives of individuals who become spotters, and unfortunately, in most cases, they are driven by greed and personal illicit enrichment. However, it should be noted that most motives are interconnected and exist in combination (besides greed, there are also ideological and political motives – Ed.). It is quite challenging to single out a category of individuals who, so to speak, are at risk, considering the individual reasons that lead them to commit a crime, such as financial status, personal hardships, unrealization, familial or historical ties to the terrorist state, ideological beliefs, etc.

What types of punishment are provided and what they depend on

The criminal actions of Ukrainians that facilitate strikes on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the front line, energy facilities, enterprises, residential areas, or military units are most frequently classified by law enforcement under two articles of the Criminal Code: art. 114-2 (unauthorized dissemination of information about the Armed Forces of Ukraine) and art. 111 (state treason). The Prosecutor General's Office adds that sometimes the actions of unwitting Ukrainians fall under diversionary activities (art. 113 of the Criminal Code). This refers to the provision of information about the location of infrastructure facilities followed by the planting of explosives intended to damage objects of significant national economic or defense importance (for example, railway property).

- Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, investigators of the Security Service of Ukraine have initiated almost 600 criminal proceedings under article 114-2 of the Criminal Code, that is, for unauthorized dissemination of information about the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Moreover, since the beginning of 2024, over 70 criminal proceedings have been opened under this article, – emphasize the SBU. – Regarding proceedings under art. 111 of the Criminal Code (state treason), which covers a much broader range of crimes, including adjusting enemy strikes, since the start of the full-scale invasion, the SBU has opened more than 3,100 corresponding criminal proceedings.

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The specific article that will be applied depends on many factors, as explained by the Security Service. In particular, the circumstances of the crime are taken into account, as well as "the purpose of the offender, confirmation of their cooperation with the Russian special services, and the consequences of their actions". Notably, if it concerns sabotage activities against Ukraine and in favor of the aggressor state – state treason (art. 111 of the Criminal Code), then it does not matter whether the enemy's strike was carried out based on information received from informants or was only planned. This is emphasized by the press service of the Prosecutor General's Office. However, the punishment for this type of crime, committed under martial law, is more severe. The Criminal Code stipulates a minimum of 15 years in prison, and a maximum of life imprisonment with confiscation of property.

The opposite situation applies to unauthorized dissemination of information, as part 3 of art. 114-2 of the Criminal Code contains a qualifying feature "causing serious consequences". In this case, spotters and fire adjusters may be deprived of their liberty for a term of 8 to 12 years. At the same time, for the dissemination of data only about weapons, armaments, or ammunition, a punishment of 3 to 5 years of imprisonment is provided, and for information about the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other military formations – from 5 to 8 years.

It should also be added that in the case of state treason, one can avoid punishment only if they do not carry out any tasks for the enemy and promptly report this to government authorities.

- Reports from the SBU about attempted recruitment are not isolated incidents, – the agency notes. – Each such case is thoroughly investigated by the special service to identify the personnel of the Russian special services conducting the recruitment, and if necessary – takes its own counterintelligence measures to expose the entire enemy agent network.

On average, those who adjust fire will spend 15 years behind bars

Over the past two years, 325 indictments against spotters (referring to cases investigated by the SBU) have been sent to court, and 180 sentences have already been issued.

As shown by the analysis of court decisions, the types of punishment for those Ukrainians who have assisted the enemy in one way or another also depend on whether they cooperated with the investigation. For instance, a resident of Zhmerynka, who filmed a military helicopter flying over the Khmelnytskyi region in April this year and shared it in a Facebook group, adding a comment about where the filming took place, recognized his guilt during the trial